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  Martin Seel

Abstract
This essay begins with some observations concerning the
interaction between nature and art. Relying on these
reflections, in the second part experience of landscape will be
interpreted as a model for the human stance within the natural
as well as the historical world. In the third part some
consequences for an ethics and politics of saving the conditions
for individual as well as social well-being will be drawn.
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1. Dialogues between art and nature
A main source of experiencing and reflecting the delicate
balances between human nature and nature in general has
always been and still is the complex interrelations between art
and nature. To shed light on the role of nature in these
relations, let me begin with the slightly altered first half of the
first sentence of Adorno's Aesthetic Theory: "It is self-evident
that nothing concerning nature is self-evident anymore."[1]
For a long time now, many have realized that we are living in
an era of increasingly frequent and severe ecological crises.
But this awareness has a peculiar characteristic. With each
menacing report it flames up anew, only soon thereafter to
subside back into a restless dozing. Yet there are more than
enough disquieting circumstances that would be suitable for
taking an unblinking look at the uncertain future of human as
well as non-human nature.
The most sobering and obdurate fact is that nature cannot be
destroyed. Human beings are not the center, crown, or
guarantor of nature. They may nourish or exploit it, but they
cannot take over its direction. If mankind were to fully
destroy its own living conditions, what would remain would be
nature, which wins every competition with it. A second
concomitant fact is that alterations in nature belong to its very
nature. The developments of industrial culture bring about
changes in these alterations, accelerating them or imparting
another direction to them, but they remain subject to its
dynamic. We are a factor in the history of nature even where
we set out to modify our genetic program. The third fact
consists in the recognition that, under current conditions, local
effects have a global impact in many cases. The emissions
increasing throughout the world, the melting of the polar
icecaps, the flooding of coastal areas, the wasteful use of
water, the pollution of the oceans, the cutting down of
atrophying forests, the erosion of soil—all these factors add up
to an alteration of the landscape, which no nation-state can
slow down on its own, not to speak of offering a cure. Social,
political, and military confrontations over the distribution of

land, air, and resources are the foreseeable consequence. The
politics of nature have become the domestic politics of the
world, that is, they have become a matter of global justice.
A fourth irritating circumstance consists in the fact that the
appearances of nature often continue to maintain their
aesthetic fascination when their impact has become
threatening or overwhelming. Our sensory grasp is unable to
measure sufficiently the quality of external nature. It could be
that we perish in a spectacle of cruel beauty. This suggessts
the fifth and, from a practical point of view, pivotal fact that
there does not exist an objective, solely decisive indicator with
regard to the treatment of nature. Our relationship to outer
and inner (that is, human) nature is dependent upon a
complex consideration of what we intend to undertake with our
knowledge about the condition of the earth, and accordingly
how the further shaping of the human life-form is supposed to
look.
Clear-sighted policies with regard to nature will have to be
concerned less with physical nature, in spite of the importance
of the investigations which provide us with information about
the ecology of the planet. The challenge lies much more in the
protection of a physiological nature which sustains our own
bodily organism, just as it does those of animal and vegetable
life forms with which we are required to live in symbiosis and
synergy for good or for evil. Because the conditions of our life
are at stake, it is not only our life that is at stake.
The nature on which this depends is not an object which we
can dominate to a greater or lesser extent, not a counterpart
to which we can more or less correspond, not even an
environment in which we have allowed much to become
wrecked and that we are now desperately trying to repair.
Instead, nature is the global space in which cultures and
societies will remain capable of development or will stiffen in
agony. For this space humanity, represented above all by the
rich industrial nations, has a responsibility which it is presently
failing to meet because it manages its economies without
giving consideration to losses. The protection of nature is a
protection from us ourselves, for the sake of us ourselves,
from the neglect and dissipation with which we disregard our
own living sphere.
But what do these uncomfortable reminders have to do with
art, as indicated in my opening statement? A great deal,
because they have to do with its discomforting powers. There,
where especially some of the more recent visual arts concern
themselves with the phenomena of nature, the recent arts
fathom the manifold disturbances of the modern relationship
to and understanding of nature by means of unsettling
presentations. Art here experiments with its forms in order to
investigate those of nature. It establishes references to nature
while being constantly overcome by doubt as to what it is in
fact referring to.
"It is self-evident that nothing concerning art is self-evident
anymore…", the original first half of the opening sentence of
Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory,[2] belongs together with my
alteration (which replaced the term 'art' with the term
'nature'). That both versions of this sentence are interrelated,
however, still is far from being self-evident.

From antiquity well into modern times, thinking about the
interconnection between art and nature was defined by
hierarchical concepts. "First nature was the model, then it
became a replica of art; "thus one could summarize a long
history of their relationship in a single sentence.[3] At first it
was the role of the artist in shaping his work to orient himself
with regard to the masterful works of nature, and hence with
regard to the laws of an overarching cosmic order or the
genius of a divine creator. Ever since the Renaissance, but
especially since the end of the eighteenth century, an
anthropocentric reversal of this normative order was initiated
that was completed with verve in the nineteenth century.
Oscar Wilde simply gave striking expression to this
turnaround when he laconically observed that "life imitates art
much more than art imitates life." Connected to this was a
direct reversal of the traditional doctrine of imitation. For
Wilde asserted "that external nature also imitates art. The
only effects that she can show us are effects that we have
already seen through poetry, or in paintings. This is the secret
of nature’s charm, as well as the explanation of nature’s
weakness."[4]
Only recently, this hierarchical mode of thinking has begun to
fade. Since the final third of the twentieth century, the inner
yet always delicate and dynamic, complicity between art and
nature was recognized more and more. This was impelled by
diverse developments in artistic production and accompanied
by increasingly sensitive theoretical reflection. From a
contemporary perspective one must take into account that the
reversal of the imitation topos falls short of the dialectic
between natural becoming and artistic creating to no less a
degree than does its original version. Misleading oppositions of
this type nonetheless continue to be mirrored in many
theoretical debates concerning what is actually to be
understood by the term 'nature.' Ultimately everything is
nature, so runs the naturalistic thesis. Everything is basically
culture, so runs the culturalist riposte. But however these
extreme positions are formulated and substantiated in
individual instances, they miss the mark of the correlation
which they grandly claim to explain. For the relationship
between nature and culture cannot be understood by someone
who is not capable of comprehending their infinite
interweavings. All comprehension of nature is a cultural
product, just as all cultural production is always dependent
upon a performance of natural forces. Also the difference
between nature and culture, including the fascination,
strangeness, and endangerment contained within their
coexistence, arises out of this complex connectedness. It is
precisely the arts and maybe, above all, the visual arts,
perhaps more than any theory, that are qualified to plumb the
depths of these interrelationships. One could almost say that
it is one of their fundamental missions to issue a reminder that
we cannot allow ourselves to take things too lightly or too
easily with regard to our cultural nature.
Art’s recent history offers extensive evidence for an underlying
adaptation of art to nature. The appearance of many works
emancipates art from the fixation on an unambiguous image of
familiar figures from the external world. "The more strictly the
works of art refrain from natural proliferation and the imitation

of nature, the more closely the successful ones approach
nature."[5] This sentence by Adorno could be used as a motto
for the uncovering of a central thread running through the
visual arts of the last two centuries. Just think of the swift
change from an imitation of a natura naturata to the pictorial
adaptation of the forces of a natura naturans or, more
recently, of the appropriation of natural configurations in the
work of artists like Anselm Kiefer, Gerhard Richter, Andreas
Gursky, Beate Gütschow, or Tacita Dean, not to speak of the
presence of urban and rural landscapes in films such as
Through the Olive Trees, Taste of Cherry, or Five by Abbas
Kiarostami.
However, the classical formulation of the reciprocal
relationship between aesthetic nature and art was already
found quite some time earlier. In §45 of his Critique of the
Power of Judgment from 1790, Immanuel Kant wrote: "Nature
was beautiful, if at the same time it looked like art; and art
can only be called beautiful if we are aware that it is art and
yet it looks to us like nature."[6] What Kant is concerned with
here, already back then, is the resolution of the question as
that serves as the model for aesthetic perception and
production: free nature or free art. Kant’s solution lies in the
thesis of a double exemplariness of nature for art and of art
for nature. The presence of aesthetically perceived nature is a
model for the inner vitality of the work of art; the imagination
of the work of art, on the other hand, is at least one model for
an intensive perception of nature. The reciprocal fecundation
of art and aesthetic nature arises only when nature, among
other things, can be perceived as successful art and when art,
among other things, can be perceived as free nature, without
the difference between art and nature being extinguished. It
is neither nature perceived in the appearance of art nor art
perceived in the appearance of nature that Kant establishes as
the norm of an unrestrained aesthetic consciousness, but
rather a dialogue between art and nature. This, of course, is
always our dialogue. It is accomplished in both the production
and the reception of art, as soon as we begin to sense how
little self-evident our own nature actually is to us.
2. The model of landscape
In the diversity of their genres and forms, especially the visual
arts give rise to quite different reactions to our reactions with
regard to nature. Whether we think of painting, photography,
sculpture, film, or video, however much these genres might
make subliminal or overt deals with each other, or whether it
is installations that integrate many of these genres into their
own structures, they all allow themselves to become uneasy at
the uncertain and vulnerable relationship that is maintained by
contemporary societies and cultures to the natural aspect of
their existence. That which impels the encounter between art
and its counterpart is accordingly both the individual and the
collective self-relationship of contemporary mankind that, at
every random corner of the world and in the contemplation of
each individual artificial or untreated object, knows itself to be
situated in the middle of a global play of comprehensive social
and natural forces. Where artistic shaping stages this play of
forces in one way or another, it uses its techniques to
investigate the landscape character of our relationships to
nature, aspects of the circumstance that, in our various

activities, we move within realms that we know constantly
exceed the horizon of our perceptual capabilities.
In the classical conception, landscape is that zone that is the
culmination of the experience of natural beauty. But the
experience of landscape is in no way limited to natural settings
which are predominantly untouched or staged in the manner of
parks. It can open frequently to an envisioning of
domesticated and urban districts. In any case, we should
remind ourselves that almost all landscapes today, even those
on the fringes of civilization, are never purely nature but
always also, even if to quite different degrees, alloys of nature
and culture. At the same time, however, the structure of
every landscape, even of those in the space of a large city, is
also always a state and event of nature. Each one, however it
may be marked and altered by the works of mankind, offers to
the aesthetic sense an essentially unguided play of abundance
and transformation, just as in predominantly untouched
nature. (This is why one could bluntly say that nature is the
nature of landscape.[7]) It is precisely this reciprocal
fecundation of nature by culture and of culture by nature in
the configuration of landscape areas that allows us to conceive
the experience of them as a theoretical model not only for the
dialogue between nature and art but also for the interaction
between natural and human flourishing in general.
The space of a landscape exists, like almost every space,
together with a variety of objects in this space. What is
fundamental for the experience of a space as landscape,
however, is not the phenomenal encounter of individual or
multiple objects, but instead the experience of being under and
amid all of these objects: in their proximity and distance, in
their constricting or liberating, eloquent, or dumb presence.
Whoever finds him or herself to be within such an abundance
of appearances, for her or him there is no middle from which a
fixed order of these appearings could be discerned. The space
of the landscape surrounds the perceiving persons; it reshapes
their location. Therefore, perceivers are in no way observers
in command of a panoramic overview (which, on the contrary,
is a common form of blindness to landscapes). Instead they
are bodily subjects who sense themselves to be receptive and
vulnerable beings amid a spatial occurrence. Thus the
perception of landscape is not solely the experiencing of the
existence and transformation of many things in a space. It is
the experience of a happening space: the experience of what
it is to be under and amid a multiform appearing of spatial
shapes.
This occurrence, to be sure, can only take place in an
extensive space. Its reality begins there where a space steps
out of its dimension in the sense that its measurements cannot
be comprehended by those who find themselves within it. The
space of a landscape has neither edge nor border; it ends at a
horizon: there where the contours, forms and delimitations
become diffuse, or there where, in the case of a labyrinthine
city, it palpably extends further, without it being possible to
comprehend these extensions from one’s own standpoint.
Landscapes are thus spaces that can be neither surveyed nor
covered. In the shifting of their horizons, they go past our
own horizon.

It is only with this vertical and horizontal incompleteness that
the space of a landscape opens up. This incompleteness
always implies an openness on the side of subjects who
conduct themselves in a certain manner to the space of their
surroundings. Ultimately, the entire sense of entering
landscapes in a mode of aesthetic awareness lies in the fact
that in them we arrive from outside: into a simultaneously
real and metaphorical outside. This outside is real because we
depart from our own four walls, in fact from all clear and
straightforward spatial coordinates. However, this is only a
necessary, but in itself not sufficient, precondition for the
experience of landscape. For an expansive space extending in
all directions is, in its own terms, simply a potential site for the
aesthetic awareness of a given landscape. There only occurs
an actual experience of landscape when, in the real exterior,
we also attain a metaphorical exterior when we loosen the
attachment to the pragmatic orientations that define our
normal behavior in space; when we no longer move through
this space with specified goals but instead maintain an
openness for the irregular presence of that extensive space
itself. However we attempt to make such presences possible
through forms of architecture and the design and preservation
of landscape in city and nature, its presence exceeds all acts of
making.
In the experience of landscapes, in other words, wherever it
may occur, there resonates a feeling of the connectedness with
nature in all cultural practice, in all social organization, and
with it, in all technology. Inherent to this experience is a seed
of the affirmation of the borders of all culture and thereby at
least a trace of ecological humility. For however limited
periods of time, it ushers us out of our imprisonment within
the conviction that, for the sake of our welfare, we ought to be
more and more able to dominate our inner and outer nature.
Even where its counterpart is not primarily a natural
landscape, it guides us into the open dimension of our naturebound, historical world.
The interaction between art and nature here once again
becomes evident. Just as in the unchained experience of
landscape, the arts confront us with the fact that all farsightedness, no matter how extensive, succumbs to a
blurriness which is only the flip side of our clarity. Art refuses
an overview most emphatically where we deem ourselves to
have a full view. It entices us to peer into the claire-obscure
of our knowledge. It endeavors to awaken us from the
dogmatic slumber with which the comfort of the industrialized
world repeatedly lulls its prosperous inhabitants. Along the
path of a disturbance of our world-views, it interrupts all selfcertain handling of the difference between nature and culture.
Not only nature proceeds past our horizon; art as well can
transcend it. In the best cases, it allows us to see our own
blindness.
3. Landscapes of living
These observations lead to the point where the model of
landscape achieves its ethical and political relevance. The
aesthetic attraction of landscapes, and paradigmatically those
of nature, enfold and deploy a contingent life of ever-changing
forms, which in their synaesthetic simultaneity and succession

enables those who encounter them a unique mode of freedom.
Especially within the realm of nature, a permanent process of
evolving and dissolving, appearing and disappearing takes
place. Here it becomes possible to loosen our personal and
cultural fixations and obsessions. Here it becomes possible to
step into non-instrumental relation to our environment. Here
it becomes possible to voluntarily let our selves be captured
by what we cannot sensibly wish to capture. This, on the one
hand, implies an affirmative awareness of the limits of our
mastery of our selves and world. This experience, on the
other hand, reminds us of what it means to be a temporary
inhabitant in a natural, cultural, social, and historical world.
Moreover, this encounter can serve as a paradigmatic scene
for what genuine, that is, undistorted and non-destructive
prosperity of human societies, means: to live in a political
environment in which natural as well as human flourishing is
welcome.
From this sketch a number of ethical and political
consequences can be drawn. First, the still primarily aesthetic
moral lies in the very appreciation of the processes of natural
unfolding itself, traditionally praised as the realm of natural
beauty. However, we should avoid any restrictive
understanding of the term 'beauty' here. To experience the
world in clear proportion or in clear disproportion to one’s own
possibilities is not what is truly compelling. Rather, to be
aware of the disharmonious in the harmonious and to the
harmonious in the disharmonious is what is compelling. There
is no beauty that soothes without irritating. No sublimity that
unsettles without liberating can be elevating.[8] Therefore,
natural beauty as well should be conceived of along the lines
offered by the model of the experience of landscape.
The second moral arises from the assumption that in the
existence of areas of more or less vivid natural environments
there lies a genuine possibility of human self-exploration. What
follows here is a general pragmatic rule for the conduct of the
individual and the collective. Regardless of how one might
otherwise live, the conscious encounter with zones of (more or
less) contingent natural growing is valuable for all, as it frees
one in relation to one’s own form of life. As an indispensable
corrective of individual and collective orientations or ideals,
natural beauty constitutes a specific dimension of human wellbeing.
The third, now strictly moral and political consequence follows
almost directly from this much weaker perspective. If a
prospering nature establishes a genuine occasion of human
well-being, then the preservation of this condition is part of
the general respect for persons. Thus, the protection and
recreation of spaces of vivid natural development become a
norm of universal morality. The ethics of nature therefore
does not need to presuppose a right of nature vis-à-vis
humanity in order to justify a strong obligation to protect the
environment. More modestly, it can simply assert that the
right to have access to more or less undistorted nature is one
among the human rights.
The meaning of this right (and its corresponding duties)
becomes clearer when we finally consider the consequences of
its violation. Here, the moral and political scandal lies not so

much or not only in the destruction of a necessary
precondition of a bearable life for all, but rather in the
destruction of a universal form of flourishing human existence.
The destruction or preclusion of natural beauty liquidates noninstrumental relations with nature in the human life-world. As
such, it leads to a destruction of positive contingency, realized
freedom, and fulfilled time. It is the destruction of a special
and irreplaceable domain of the human world. Just as there is
no life for humanity without nature as a regenerative means of
subsistence and no at least bearable life without physiological
nature as an intact environment for human as well as nonhuman beings, so too the quality of human life is greatly
impoverished without areas of an accommodating nature.[9]
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